| In
the last chapter, we showed that sci-tech was dominant in the large-scale
cultural process we humans experience. Now lets consider how to
use this fact to explore humanitys future.
Obviously, the first step would be to explore sci-tech growth, see where
its headed. But what a daunting task! To start with, we must learn
all of todays sci-tech. Only this. A hundred years ago, one person
might succeed. But hardly today, when sci-tech has exploded in volume
and proliferated into many specialties. And after this, we would need
to estimate where each of these specialties - in materials science, biology,
physics, medicine, astronomy, etc. - is likely to grow. And this is made
particularly difficult by the fact that an advance in one area might have
difficult-to-foresee applications in other areas. So the laser, when invented,
was merely a kind of scientific curiosity; now, among many other uses,
it drills teeth, identifies prices in the supermarket, and could power
a spacecraft to the moon.
In short, our task just looks impossible, and discouraging. One day, however,
I was struck by a useful thought. What sci-tech really does for us is
increase our powers. What really counts, then, is the powers and their
potential growth. This led to the first of two simplifications for looking
into the future.
(1) First Simplification
Lets forget about all sci-tech that's potentially knowable - an infinity
of possibilities. Lets avoid trying to foresee everything future sci-tech
will produce. Instead, lets drastically reduce our focus and so
simplify the task. Instead of exploring all sci-tech, lets concentrate
on the powers it brings, specifically on how any future sci-tech growth
might increase a number of fundamental powers. By fundamental powers,
I mean those that are basic to a high-capacity existence, that play a
role in almost any manipulation. They determine the breadth of the surrounding
universe intelligent beings can influence or control, and the depth of
their control over matter within that realm. I ultimately decided upon
six powers.
I chose communication and transportation because these powers govern the
portion of the universe over which any system of intelligent beings can
gain practical dominion. After all, one can influence only that portion
of the universe one can practically reach. These powers also govern many
interactions within this sphere.
I chose energy, specifically those manipulations permitting access to
the largest stores of low-cost energy.
Energy
is of course basic for all manipulations. This category governs the size
of the supply of cheap energy. It therefore helps limit the maximum size
(or number) of giant projects that can practically be undertaken. More
important, it helps determine the energy rate at which advanced systems
of beings live.
I chose
engines and power devices because these provide the muscle for manipulation.
They also help govern the size of manipulations that are practical, particularly
at the extremes - at the nano (e.g. atomic) and the astronomical scale.
I chose
synthesis and reduction because these powers govern what can be produced
and disposed of, in a sense: what can be made to appear and disappear.
These powers, particularly synthesis, are obviously fundamental and most
important. They can also substitute for other powers. For example, if
you destroy something here and synthesize it there, this is equivalent
to transporting it, although perhaps its not the kind of travel
you would prefer.
You might wonder why we omit a possible seventh category: the power to
make physical and mental changes in ourselves. Growing knowledge of genes
and how they work, of differentiation, of transplants and implants - biological,
electronic, etc. suggest these changes could be profound and their number
possibly infinite. Even more important, it's easy to imagine how changes
we might make in ourselves could decisively influence our choices among
the other categories. For example, if men could give birth to babies -
not something advocated here - imagine the influence on families, dating,
law, child custody, business, etc.
But we don't need this seventh power because all possible changes we might
make in ourselves are already covered by the synthesis-human category.
[ecometic category (ecometic being a term for the universal type of which
humanity is the local example)] But this isn't the crucial point. The
crucial one is that no matter how much we altered ourselves, the basic
powers would still apply. So, for example, even if we tripled our mental
powers, we would still face the same speed limits in travel or communication.
These limits would still govern.
Some readers will note other areas where the powers overlap. For example,
engines are crucial to transportation, and synthesis really could cover
engines and much else. We keep our six categories, however, because they
are useful. So this first simplification frees us from having to consider
all the possible future growth of sci-tech. We can limit ourselves to
only that growth that augments the six fundamental powers.
But now we face a second problem. Suppose, for example, we are trying
to foresee the year 2075. How do we predict the exact state of the six
fundamental powers then? And, obviously, the more aspects of these powers
we guess wrong, the worse our general picture of this time will be.
Yet
such predictions are far from easy. For instance, one of the best futurists
is Arthur C. Clarke. In his book Profiles of the Future, published
in 1963, and so written perhaps a year earlier, he attempts to predict
what sci-tech will accomplish by specific years in the future. He wrote
that by the year 1990, we will have achieved the following: fusion power,
exobiology, (the discovery of life beyond Earth), gravity waves detected,
and cyborgs (human enhanced by one or more mechanical or electronic devices,
and that by 2000 we will be colonizing planets, and will have created
artificial intelligence. But by 2004, except perhaps for cyborgs, we still
had none of these things. So Arthur C. Clarke, looking just 30 to 40 years
ahead, didnt do too well. And none of us today, looking a similar
distance ahead, is likely to do much better.
What to do? One possibility: sci-tech might stop growing at some time
in the future; then we could attempt to foresee conditions at that particular
time. But Senator Arthur Vandenberg, science advisor to President Truman,
famously called science "the endless frontier," and most scientists
today would agree with this characterization, and, perhaps technology
is similarly "endless." Consider, too, that the top foot of
most soils contains unknown species and unexplored ecology, and the more
other planets we explore, the more new kinds of life we are likely to
discover. In short, an end to all possible growth of science and technology
seems most unlikely. And if sci-tech keeps growing, how can we make use
of our fundamental powers?
(2)
The Second Simplification
This question calls forth the second simplification. This is to avoid
trying to foresee fundamental powers in particular future years, like
the years 2075, 3000, 3500, for example. Instead, we should let each important
aspect of each power grow as much as it practically can. So in the communication
power, for example, the important aspects are (1) speed, (2) cost, and
(3) the number of bits sendable per second. We just let sci-tech growth
keep increasing these aspects and those of all the other fundamental powers.
If
we are fortunate, we may discover that the universe limits the growth
of some of these aspects. It will not allow them an endless increase.
Then, assuming this is so, instead of trying to foresee certain future
dates, lets focus upon that particular future when all the limited
aspects of the fundamental powers have grown as much as they can.
If just a few fundamental power aspects are limited, then our approach
will not work very well, because sci-tech growth could continue thereafter
and so could keep improving all the other unlimited powers. And this continued
growth, continued greater empowerment, would keep changing how future
humans live, frustrating our capacity to make accurate predictions. But
the more limited aspects we find, the better.
So lets explore the fundamental powers to see how many of their aspects
are limited. But first, we should note that there are four kinds of limits.
(3)
Four Kinds of Limits
(A) The first of these are absolute limits.
These are the limits strictly determined by the character of universal
mass-energy-space-time itself. The speed of light is an example. Although
scientists of the future may find faster ways to send messages - to the
astonishment of today's well-informed - evidently the universe will not
let us send even massless photons faster. So the first kind of limits
are those that the universe strictly establishes.
(B) Practical limits
The second kind are practical limits. Cases of diminishing returns are
examples. Here, although further sci-tech growth would permit still greater
empowerment, after a certain point the potential gains, being insignificant,
would not be worth the effort. So for example, if we learn to travel from
point X to point Y in five minutes, it may just not be worth it to try
to get there faster. Another kind of practical limit is where the alternative
means works better. In this case, if sci-tech growth cannot overcome the
inferior aspect, then there's no advantage in improving its other aspects,
for the entity can never be as good as the superior alternative. An example
is a material that melts too easily to serve as an engine part.
(C) Limits from Calousian choice
The third limit is that of Calousian choice. Here again, further sci-tech
growth could further empower, but our knowledge of the Calousian and her
condition leads us to conclude she would seldom or never choose to exercise
these additional powers. In these areas, therefore, sci-tech growth cannot
empower further. Such growth would yield only unwanted powers.
An example might be the synthesis of altered Earthly animals and plants.
We suggest this may be an unwanted power for three reasons. The first
is the Calousian capacity for synthesis. Lets presume Calousians can not
only synthesize foods indistinguishable from the natural variety (e.g.,
synthesizing turkey legs without the turkey), but also edibles enormously
more complex, interesting and varied than the natural variety. Furthermore,
the Calousians' synthetic capacity in other areas means they don't need
cotton for cloth, cattle hides for shoes, or Douglas fir for construction.
Therefore, they don't need to alter these species, i.e., "improve"
them for these purposes.
Second is the Calousian's capacity to produce imaginary things. When Calousians
desire taste pleasures beyond what real foods can supply, they might switch
to imaginary feasts. Just as movies give us imaginary adventures, so a
comparable technology simulating textures, flavors, aromas, etc., could
offer the Calousian any imaginable eating experience, delighting both
eye and palate. Note that many of today's recipes, particularly those
with numerous ingredients, are "unnatural" in the sense that
the final product is found nowhere in nature.
Finally, it's conceivable that Calousian nourishment differs from ours.
Perhaps they satisfy their needs with a few pills. In consequence, our
eating habits may appear as gross and disgusting to them as the cannibalism
of some primitives does to us.These points suggest Calousians may not
rely as much as we do on plants and animals for food, fiber, etc., and
so would have little need to attempt to "improve" Earthly species
for this purpose. So although their sci-tech could permit an infinity
of manipulations here, the Calousian would have little incentive to perform
them. To the degree they behave this way, this condition would function
as a limit. This limit of Calousian choice is obviously difficult to apply
because it's all too easy to extend our present desires and values to
Calousian times, where they may be wholly inappropriate and so would greatly
distort our view of Calousian life.
(D) Limits because the sci-tech area does not empower
Much very good science (and some technology) does not empower. It may
satisfy, it may reveal and clarify, it may delight, but it does not empower.
Francis Bacon to the contrary, "knowledge is ..(not always) power."
For example, a paleontologist searching through sedimentary rock finds
a heretofore unknown species. The discovery, cataloging and studying of
this specimen is good science and it enlarges our understanding of Earth's
past. It's unlikely, however, to increase our powers.
As noted, when first invented the laser was considered of no practical
value, just a scientific curiosity; now it has a hundred uses. So what
truly falls in this category is not always obvious. However, the more
we advance and the more computer-stored and computer-generated knowledge
we acquire, the fewer surprises we should encounter.
(4)
Summary
In sum, to see the future through the growth of its key factor, sci-tech,
we decided upon two simplifications. The first was to avoid exploring
all future sci-tech, and focus instead upon how any of its growth might
increase six fundamental powers. The second was to attempt to foresee,
not all futures, but that particular one where high-capacity beings have
acquired all the limited aspects of the six powers.
Next, we described four kinds of limits to sci-tech growth's capacity
to keep increasing powers. These are: the limits strictly set by the universe,
the limits of practicality, the limits arising from Calousian choice,
and limits where the sci-tech area does not empower.
Remember, the crucial point for our future-looking purposes is not whether
sci-tech can keep growing. Apparently it can. Think again of the potential
new life forms on other planets. The crucial point is how many and what
aspects of the six fundamental powers the universe limits.
Now lets see.
>Next Six
Fundamental Powers
References
and Notes
[knight.city.ba.]
F. Bacon, Meditationes Sacrae (pub, place, date). Francis Bacon lived from
1561-1626 and wrote Meditationes Sacrae in 1597.
© Warren A. Musser
2005 |
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